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This paper explores how acquirers’ prior performance influences their selection of target 
firms across different industries contingent upon environmental conditions. Although 
extensive stream of research has advanced our understandings on what motivates a 
particular firm to pursue the acquisitions, a critical question still remains on what leads 
firms to select targets in different industries once they have decided to acquire. Using 
the sample of U.S. manufacturing firms, the paper argue that motivation to employ 
specific acquisition strategy (i.e., related or unrelated acquisition) is simultaneously 
affected by an individual performance feedback condition and environmental 
characteristics that acquiring firm compete in. Through incorporating behavioral 
perspectives with task environment dimensions (i.e., dynamism), the study examines the 
 
contingency effects of environmental condition upon firm’s acquisition strategies. 
Therefore, the study contributes to both streams of performance feedback theory and 
acquisition literature by identifying more integrative approach of antecedents that 
explains differences in acquisition behaviors.  
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Originated from the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), a 
large volume of research has explored how managerial perception on firm’s unique 
situation affects organizational behaviors (March & Shapira, 1987, 1992; Bromiley, 
1991; Greve 1998). According to the behavioral perspective, firms evaluate their 
performance relative to a reference point (i.e., aspiration level) and decide whether to 
preserve or alter their organizational behaviors. Early behavioral studies have primarily 
focused on examining the influence of performance feedback on organizational risk 
taking (e.g., Audia & Greve 2006) or search behaviors (e.g., Chen & Miller 2007). 
Recent studies, however, have extended this stream of research to explaining further 
search behaviors that eventuate in acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Ruth et al. 2013). 
These researches compared to extant acquisition literatures, which were considerably 
focused on examining ex-post acquisition performances (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Cloodt 
et al., 2006), significantly contributed to the acquisition literatures by identifying the 
firm specific situational antecedents of acquisitions. Although this nascent stream of 
research has advanced our understandings on what motivates a particular firm to pursue 
the acquisitions, a critical question still remains on what leads firms to undertake 
different acquisition strategies once they have decided to acquire. 
While the behavioral theory focuses on internal managerial perspectives, 
organization theorists and industrial organization economists argue that a choice of firm 
strategies is not only determined by internal aspects but also by external features, such 
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as environment or industry characteristics (Chandler, 1962; Child, 1972; Cyert & March, 
1963; Porter, 1980). Both population-ecology (Campbell, 1969; Hannan & Freeman, 
1997; Aldrich, 1979) and resource-dependence theory (Jacobs 1974; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) emphasizes the importance of the environment or the social context for 
understanding organizations and their decisions while industrial organization economics 
underlines the structural characteristics of industries as the main determinants of success 
(Porter, 1980). These theories simultaneously imply that external factors inevitably 
constrain firms to adjust their strategies according to an environment in which they 
operate. Regardless of the importance of external conditions on strategic decision 
makings, however, relatively little attention has been paid on the role of both internal 
and external features to organizational strategies (Shinkle, 2012). Thus, the paper further 
delves into the effect of environmental dynamism on differences in acquisition 
behaviors. 
This study attempts to advance our understanding of how both internal firm 
specific situation and external environmental condition influences acquirer's target 
selection. In particular, I explore how firm’s prior performance relative to aspiration 
level motivates them to acquire specific target firms across different industries (i.e., 
related or unrelated acquisition), and how this relationship changes contingent upon 
dynamism of environment. The paper suggests that conventional predictions of the 
behavioral theory might not be supported under diverse environmental conditions since 
different industry structures generate variations in organizational performances 
(Hawawini et al., 2003), thereby affects the decision of a direction to carry out the 
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acquisitions. The study therefore extends the previous researches that perceive 
performance feedback as a behavioral motivation to strategic changes, by integrating the 
behavioral theory of the firm with the role of environment (Goll et al., 1997). 
The paper makes three primary contributions to research on the behavioral 
theory of the firm and acquisition literatures. First, while prior application studies of the 
behavioral theory primarily focused on examining the effect of firm’s internal condition 
on organizational changes, the study considers the role of both internal and external 
features that affect organizational strategies by combining the theory with the task 
environment dimensions. Therefore, the study provides a more synthetic framework for 
understanding organizational acquisition behaviors. Secondly, the integration of theories 
indicates that environmental characteristics do not uniformly affect all firms within an 
industry. Rather, the influence of environment respectively depends on firm’s specific 
performance situation. Lastly, the study contributes to the relatively nascent stream of 
research that extends the behavioral theory into the domain of corporate level strategies, 
merger and acquisition, by focusing on the choice of acquisition strategies. Specifically, 
I propose that a failure or a success to meet aspirations level triggers or hinders firms 
from selecting target companies operating in different industries. To examine the 
hypotheses, I applied logit regression by using the sample of publicly listed U.S. 
manufacturing firms (SIC code 2000-3999) who have performed any types of 




2. Theory & Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Behavioral Theory of the Firm  
 
The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March 1963; Levinthal & March 
1981; Shapira 1986) proposes that organizations follow the process of performance 
evaluation, solution search, and decision-making. Managers compare their performance 
relative to aspiration levels to determine whether they are experiencing failures or 
successes and this evaluation shapes further organizational behaviors. If the gap 
generated between the aspiration levels and organizational performances, also known as 
“attainment discrepancy” (Lant, 1992), is negative, managers perceive their situation as 
a failure and engage in a problemistic search, hoping to find adequate solutions to the 
underlying problems (Cyert & March 1963). On the contrary, managers tend to adhere to 
current strategies when they are receiving positive feedback, or positive attainment 
discrepancy, from their organizational behaviors.    
Majority of the studies that have examined the influence of performance 
feedback to organizational changes were centered on explaining differences in risk 
taking behaviors (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Bromiley, 1991; March & Shapira 
1992). However, recent studies have extended this stream of research by examining the 
relationship of performance feedback to a broader set of strategic behaviors such as 
search behavior (Chen & Miller 2007; Bromiley & Washburn 2011), illegal behavior 
(Mishina et al., 2010) and partnering behavior (Baum et al., 2005). The results indicate 
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that firms performing below aspiration levels are inclined to take greater risks compared 
to firms performing above aspiration levels motivated to recover from the repairable 
gaps (Bromiley et al. 2001; Nickel and Rodriguez 2002; Audia & Greve, 2006).  
Further applications of the theory involve acquisition behaviors. Iyer and 
Miller (2008) employed the performance feedback theory to explain the timing of 
acquisitions while Ruth et al. (2013) applied the theory to explore motivation and ability 
to undertake acquisitions. Although deciding whether to acquire or not is crucial in the 
decision-makings of an organization, it is also equally important to decide in which 
direction to carry out the acquisition thereafter. Park (2002) considered both firm’s prior 
profitability and industry prior profitability to clarify the relationship between 
diversification strategies and post-performances, yet the study used relatively simple 
model to test the hypotheses. Moreover it does not shed light on whether the prior 
performance level motivates acquirers to adopt certain diversification strategies. 
Therefore, this paper explores the direction of acquisition by applying the performance 
feedback theory to understand the firm specific situation that influences managerial 
choices of acquisition strategies.   
 
2.2 Organizational Task Environments 
 
While prior behavioral theories focused on delineating organizational changes 
with regard to a firm’s internal situation, theories such as population-ecology theory 
(Campbell, 1969; Hannan & Freeman, 1997; Aldrich, 1979) and resource-dependence 
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theory (Jacobs 1974; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) emphasize the importance of a firm’s 
dependency on external environments. They posit that organizations are inseparable 
from environmental factors primarily due to resource availability, and also with regard 
to new opportunities that can be exploited or explored (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990). Therefore, both theoretical and empirical management studies conclude that 
environmental conditions extensively influence organizational strategies (Pfeffer, 1973; 
Pfeffer & Nowak, 1974; Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973). Studies by early investigators of the 
resource dependence theory examined the effects of environmental factors on 
organizational strategies such as the formulation of boards of directors (Pfeffer, 1973), 
merger (Pfeffer, 1972) and joint-venture behaviors (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1974). 
Furthermore, since organizations are contingent upon both internal and external 
conditions (Hofer, 1975), the studies have concluded that it is significant to match 
strategies to environmental changes (Miller & Friesen 1983). 
According to organizational perspectives, the environment has been considered 
to have multidimensional effects on organizational activities (Keats & Hitt, 1988; 
Aldrich, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984). Among the multiple environmental dimensions, 
this study focuses on one commonly used dimensions; dynamism. Environmental 
dynamism is characterized by environmental turbulence, instability, volatility and 
uncertainty. It is defined as highly unpredictable and uncertain rapid environmental 
changes that stem from a shift in customer demand, an introduction of a new technology 
or an action from competitors (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). Consistent with organizational 
theorists, strategic management studies empirically support the moderating role of 
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environmental effects on firm strategies. For example, Lim et al. (2009) supports the 
moderating effects of environmental dynamism between diversification strategy and the 
firm’s level of debt financing while Heeley et al. (2006) examines the moderating role of 
three environmental dimensions in relation to R&D investment and the possibility of 
target firms getting acquired.  
Following the stream of researches, this study also investigates how 
environmental dynamism influence firms’ target selections in acquisitions. It is 
especially important to consider environmental, or industry characteristics, when 
exploring the antecedents of the direction of acquisition because not only organizational 
specific factors determine differences in firm profit but industry variables also affects 
the performances (Grinyer et al. 1988; Hansen & Wernerfelt 1989). Therefore, by 
emphasizing the importance of both external environmental factors and internal 
organizational situations, this paper provides more integrative framework for 
understanding acquisition behavior. 
 
2.3 Related acquisition vs. Unrelated acquisition.  
 
Following the description of risk from the classical decision theory, which 
explains the degree of risk as a variation in the distribution of possible outcomes and 
their likelihoods (March & Shapira 1987), this study regards unrelated acquisition as a 
relatively uncertain and riskier strategy than related acquisition. Firms are generally 
unfamiliar with unrelated industries as they often lack relevant knowledge or resources 
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about the industries (Govindarajan, 1989; Gupta, 1984) thereby the possibility of 
successfully diversifying into those businesses significantly varies, leading to a larger 
variance in future outcomes. Thus the study considers unrelated acquisition as a greater 
strategic change that includes explorative characteristics than related acquisition (Sitkin 




3.1 Problemistic Search  
 
According to the behavioral theory, firms performing below aspiration levels 
perceive their organizational actions as failures and undertake problemistic search. This 
problemistic search, however, follows gradational phases from searching for nearest 
local solutions to distant solutions when the initial search process fails to discover 
“satisfying” alternatives (Cyert & March, 1963). Failures to find competent solutions in 
the initial search stage subsequently pressures firms to adopt more dramatic, radical 
strategic changes (March & Simon 1958) such as overturning their existing corporate 
portfolio through acquisition (Park 2002; Iyer & Miller, 2008). 
Once firms have decided to overturn their strategies through engaging in 
acquisitions, the next step is to select an appropriate target firm that will alleviate their 
negative attainment discrepancies. According to the attention based view and shift-of-
focus model (March & Shapira, 1987 & 1992; Ocasio 1997), firms shift their focus of 
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attention to different reference points relative to their performance position to aspiration 
level. These theories suggest that firms performing below the aspiration level focus their 
attention on two points; 1) aspiration level and 2) survival point. Firms who focus on 
aspiration level view their failures as a repairable gap and tend to increase risk taking 
behaviors as their performance falls below the aspiration level. However, further 
decreases in performance shifts their focus of attention from aspiration level to survival 
point and perceive their negative attainment discrepancies as a huge threat to a complete 
failure. Therefore, these firms tend to reduce risk taking behaviors and become more 
risk aversive (Audia & Greve, 2006). In accordance with this view, I predict that firms 
slightly below their aspiration levels are expected to go through more unrelated 
acquisitions over related acquisition in an attempt to explore and develop newer, more 
innovative and radical solutions that can boost their organizational performances to its 
aspiration levels. However, as their performance falls furthermore from the aspiration 
level, firms interpret their situation as a threat to failure, thereby reluctant to 
significantly change their current domain of corporate activities. Thus, these firms are 
expected to acquire firms within their markets rather than to acquire target firms from 
completely different markets that takes more time and costs to go through post-merger 
integration process.   
Therefore, I predict that firms performing slightly below their aspiration level, 
or experiencing small negative attainment discrepancies, tend to more acquire targets 
from unrelated industries whereas firms performing far below their aspiration, or 
experiencing large negative attainment discrepancies, tend to more acquire targets 
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within their same industry. Accordingly, I hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: As performance relative to aspiration level increase, firms are more likely 
to engage in unrelated acquisition over related acquisition for firms performing below 
the aspiration levels 
 
3.2 Slack Search   
 
On the contrary, the behavioral theorists supports that firms become more risk 
aversive when performing above aspiration levels. According to organizational learning 
perspectives (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958), firms are perceived as 
organizations that rely heavily on their previous operational process unless faced with 
threats. Thus, when firms obtain positive feedback from the organization’s chosen action, 
they tend to continuously repeat the process by remaining the status quo and become 
less inclined to change. Empirical research have supported this argument; Park (2002) 
found that high profit firms, compared to low profit firms, tend to seek less strategic 
change while Greve (2003) concludes that the propensity to change falls more rapidly 
for above-aspiration firms compared to below-aspiration firms. 
Moreover, the attention based view and shift-of-focus model (March & Shapira, 
1987 & 1992; Ocasio 1997) suggest that firms performing far above the aspiration level 
are expected to shift their focus of attention from aspiration level to slack search. 
Organizational slacks are defined as underutilized spare resources that act as a buffer 
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against future unforeseeable events by enabling firms to initiate new strategic changes 
(March, 1979; Levinthal & March, 1981). As the performance increases far above the 
aspiration level, firms generally tend to accumulate large volume of slack resources that 
needs to be effectively in use. Therefore, as the performance compared to aspiration 
level increases, firms shift their attention from aspiration to slack search, and this search 
tends to focus on advancing their previous organizational procedures as they are already 
receiving strong positive feedbacks from their corporate activities. In other words, firms 
with higher performance relative to aspiration level would be reluctant to adopt dramatic 
changes through exploring new industries by acquisitions that often possess greater 
possibility of potential failures. Meanwhile, related acquisition allows firms to 
concentrate on exploiting their already established business by developing their existing 
resources, knowledge and capabilities.  
Thus, I hypothesize that further increase in performance relative to aspiration 
level will lead firms to undergo more related acquisition rather than unrelated 
acquisition in order to maintain and enhance their successful position in a current 
industry. Accordingly, I hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: As performance increases relative to aspiration level, firms will more 
likely to engage in related acquisition over unrelated acquisition for firms performing 




3.3 Moderating effect of environment   
 
Organizational theorists view external environment as a major facet that 
heavily influences a firms’ managerial decisions. Studies have shown that external 
environmental factors directly or indirectly affect firm performance (Bain, 1956; Rumelt 
1991) and stimulate strategic behaviors (Porter, 1980). Therefore, firms are expected to 
tailor their strategies with respect to their external environmental changes. For example, 
a particular acquisition strategy may be considered as a more appropriate strategy since 
the need for specific knowledge or resources varies upon environmental characteristics. 
Moreover, according to the industrial organization economics, industry specific 
characteristics that a firm competes in and its relative position to competitors affect firm 
profitability (Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989). Therefore, the industry conditions along with 
the organizational factors simultaneously influence managerial decisions regarding the 
choice of acquisition strategies.  
This section elaborates on how environmental conditions moderate the 
relationship between a firm’s prior performance and acquisition strategies. Particularly, 
the paper focuses on the most common dimensions of environment, an environmental 
dynamism (Aldrich, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988).  
 
3.3.1 Environmental Dynamism 
 
Environmental dynamism refers to both the uncertainty and the unpredictability 
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of change that occurs within an industry (Khandwalla, 1972; Sharfman & Dean, 1991). 
In a dynamic environment, externally induced environmental changes that are difficult 
to anticipate or to draw discernable patterns heighten the uncertainty for organizations to 
obscure them to predict any consequences from the changes (Mintzberg, 1979; Dess & 
Beard 1984).  
Under relatively stable and non-dynamic environments, firms do not require 
highly intricate or risky strategies (Aldrich, 1979). Thus firms performing well above 
the aspiration level in a non-dynamic environment were expected to pursue more related 
acquisitions over unrelated acquisitions to sustain and enhance their market position by 
continuing their business in their respective industry. Therefore, a primary motivation 
for the acquisition would be to maintain stability while seeking for growth (Ansoff, 
1957). However, the motivation for acquisition may be different for firms performing in 
high dynamic environments.  
Unlike firms operating in low dynamic environments, firms operating in high 
dynamic environments are faced with erratic environmental turbulences that stem from a 
shift in customer demand, an introduction of a new technology or an action from 
competitors (Rosenbusch et al., 2013).  These dynamic environments, however, can be 
perceived as two distinct situations depending upon firm’s specific situations; either as a 
growth opportunity or as challenges.  
Firstly, firms with strong growth desire can view dynamic environment as a 
growth opportunity as rapid environmental changes create new opportunities for growth-
oriented firms (Drucker, 1985). For instance, changes in demand allows firms to seek for 
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new customer needs, products and services that can be accommodated to the new 
demands (Wiklund & Shepherd 2003) and the technological discontinuities allows firms 
to develop new technological trajectories (Utterback, 1994). Therefore, environmental 
conditions that are associated with shifts in customer demands and technologies provide 
ample opportunities for firms seeking growth (Chandler & Hanks, 1994; Covin & Slevin, 
1991; Zahra, 1993). Although dynamic conditions often puts firms into difficult 
situations in implementing appropriate strategies, firms that can effectively exploit and 
explore the opportunities generated from such environmental conditions can outperform 
their competitors (Rosenbusch et al. 2013).  
The primary motive for firms performing slightly below aspiration level is 
strongly associated with pursuing growth that can overcome their adversities. Therefore 
these firms pose high motivations to fully exploit the opportunities created from the 
dynamic environment instead of exploring into new markets. By engaging in related 
acquisitions, underperformers can expand their current business and reap the benefits by 
tailoring themselves to new growth opportunities. Thus, firms who regard their negative 
attainment discrepancy as repairable gap is expected to take more related acquisitions as 
environments get more dynamic. However, firms performing far below aspiration level 
will be primarily concerned with survival. Anderson and Tushman (2001) supported that 
environmental uncertainty is a lethal characteristic that leads firms to exit more from 
current industries. Therefore, if firms are already underperforming in this type of 
industry, underperformers have a greater incentive to escape from the current industry 
and search for a new market that is less volatile and more profitable by engaging in 
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unrelated acquisition. Accordingly, I hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Environmental dynamism will mitigate the relationship between prior 
performance and acquisition strategies for firms performing below their aspiration 
levels. 
On the other hand, dynamic environment can pose some challenges to firms. 
Focusing on previously developed routines or capabilities create a misfit between the 
altering external condition and the firm’s existing resources or capabilities which, in turn, 
adversely affect the firm’s performance by lowering the flexibility of coping with rapid 
changes (Anderson & Tushman, 1990, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2007). However, exploring 
new areas or building novel capabilities broaden alternative choice sets that adaptively 
apply a firms’ prior resources and routines to changing environments (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990), thereby mitigating existing resources from being obsolete (Fleming, 
2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001) and prevent firms from being trapped in an 
organizational inertia (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). Therefore, firms who view the dynamic 
environments as a threat will try to diversify their corporate portfolios through exploring 
new business areas.  
When faced with environmental turbulences, firms performing above the 
aspiration level are more inclined to focus on retaining their successful position rather 
than pursuing excessive growth. Firms that have been receiving positive feedbacks from 
their original corporate activities with large business units and resources have a high 
possibility of being trapped in organizational inertia and fail to effectively cope with 
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rapid environmental changes. Therefore, as the environment gets more dynamic, these 
firms are expected to increase their firm flexibility by broadening alternative choice sets. 
Furthermore, since firms with successful positions often possess sufficient ability to 
diversify, such as organizational slack or financial resources, they can withstand a few 
experiments (i.e., acquiring firms from unrelated industries) without a fear of falling 
below the aspiration level. Therefore, increase in firm’s performance above aspiration 
levels leads them to engage less in related acquisitions than beforehand but to enhance 
their corporate flexibilities that can effectively manage unforeseeable contingencies 
when environment gets dynamic. Accordingly, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Environmental dynamism will mitigate the relationship between prior 
performance and acquisition strategies for firms performing above their aspiration 
levels 
 
4. Data & Method 
 
The M&A deal data were obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
Plantinum database and these data were further combined with company information 
data obtained from Compustat database. Final M&A deal data were collected if: (1) the 
deals were completed between year of 2000 to 2013; (2) the company was operating in 
manufacturing industry (SIC codes 2000-3999); (3) the deal values were greater than $1 
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million; (4) there was full financial data available for acquirer in the Compustat; and (5) 
the acquirer with less than 50% ownership of the target firm before the deal owned more 
than 50% of the target shares after the deal was completed. As a result, the total sample 
consisted of 1,275firms. Among them, 549 firms (43% of total firms) engaged in 
unrelated diversification and 726 firms (57% of total firms) engaged in related 
diversification, respectively. Logistic regression model was employed to test the 
hypotheses and standardized beta coefficients are reported in the result tables. Compared 
to unstandardized regression coefficients, standardized beta coefficients are more useful 
when variables in the models are measured in different units of measurement or when a 
unit increase of explanatory variable does not give a clear sense of whether the change is 
“big” or “small” with regard to the scale (Agresti 1996). 
 
4.1 Dependent Variable 
 
Acquisition strategy is measured as a dummy variable. It is indicated as 1 if the 
first two digits of the SIC code among the four digits were same for acquirer and target 
firms and 0 otherwise. Therefore, related acquisition is coded as 1 whereas unrelated 
acquisition is coded as 0 (Palepu, 1985). 
 
4.2 Independent Variable 
 
Attainment discrepancy: We follow extant studies (i.e., Miller & Chen, 2007) 
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that have independently run two different models with two aspiration proxies: Historical 
aspiration and Social aspiration. Historical attainment discrepancy (performance – 
historical aspiration) is the difference between a firm’s ROA measured in (t-1) period 
and (t-2) period and Social attainment discrepancy (performance – social aspiration) is 
the difference between a firm’s ROA measured in (t-1) and median ROA of firms in the 
same 4 digits SICS industry in (t-1) period. Lastly, Environment Dynamism was 
measured as the standard errors of regression slopes from regressing industry sales on 
time for five years (Keats & Hitt, 1988; Tosi et al., 1973) 
 
4.3 Control Variable 
 
All control variables are measured as one year lagged period where M&A deal 
year is considered to be period (t). Firstly, firm’s intangible resources were controlled. 
According to Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991), firm’s possession of intangible resources 
heavily influences their direction of acquisition activities. Thus, following the stream of 
research, I controlled two main intangible resources that firms have invested in, R&D 
intensity and advertisement intensity. R&D Intensity is measured as the ratio of total 
R&D expenditure to total sales. Advertisement Intensity is measured as ratio of total 
advertisement expenditure to total sales. Furthermore, total of three types of slack 
resources were also controlled. Unabsorbed slack is measured as the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities while Absorbed slack is measured as the ratio of selling, 
general, and administrative expenses (SGAE) to total sales. Moreover, Potential slack is 
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measured as the ratio of debt to equity (Bromiley, 1991). To control for firm specific 
characteristics, Firm Size and threat to bankruptcy, Altman’s (1983) Z-score, were 
included. Firm Size is measured as log of total assets and Altman’s Z-score is calculated 
as (1.2 x working capital divided by total assets) + (1.4 x retained earnings divided by 
total assets) + (3.3 x income before interest expense and taxes divided by total assets) + 
(0.6 x market value of equity divided by total liability) + (1.0 x sales divided by total 
assets). Moreover, if the acquisition was conducted during the period of the Global 
Financial Crisis (year 2008 to 2009), the Financial Crisis variable was coded as 1 and 0 
for all the other years. Lastly, two other dimensions of task environments, environmental 
munificiency and complexity, were also controlled for the acquirer’s industry. 
Environmental munificence represents the degree of environmental capacity that can 
support sustained growth in terms of resource availability (Aldrich, 1979; Sharfman & 
Dean, 1991). The scarcity or abundance of resources within an industry influences both 
the survival and growth of firms operating in the environment (Randolph & Dess, 1984). 
On the other hand, environmental complexity implies the degree of heterogeneity and 
the diversity of environmental elements that needs to be taken into account in strategic 
decision-makings (Child, 1972; Aldrich, 1979). In a complex environment, firms 
interact with a wide range of environmental factors such as customers, suppliers, or 
competitors and this complex task environment, in turn, intensifies the uncertainty and 
information processing demands (Duncan 1972; Dess & Beard, 1984). Acquirer’s 
Industry Munificiency was measured as the standard errors of regression slopes from 
regressing industry sales on time for five years (Keats & Hitt, 1988; Tosi et al., 1973) 
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while Industry Complexity was captured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
HHI is measured as squaring the market share of each firm in same industry, and then 




 Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics and correlations among variables 
used in the study. Most of the correlations among each variable ranges from low to 
moderate range of numbers except for two pairs of correlation; correlation between two 
different performance–aspiration variables (r=0.82) and correlation between absorbed 
slack and R&D intensity (r=0.78). High correlation between two negative attainment 
discrepancy variables, however, is not a concern in this study as they hypotheses 1 and 2 
for different aspiration levels; model 2 tests the effect of firm’s performance relative to 
their historical aspiration levels on acquisition behaviors while model 3 tests the effect 
of firm’s relative performance level to social aspiration levels on acquisition behaviors.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that for firms performing under aspiration level, as their 
performance compared to aspiration level increases they will more likely to undertake 
unrelated acquisition over related acquisition in an attempt to find innovative and new 
solutions from relatively nascent industry. Model 2 finds support for this hypothesis, 
while model 3 does not. The negative and significant coefficient of performance- 
aspiration (below aspiration) for model 2 indicates that one standard deviation of 




Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Mean Std. dev (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1) Acquisition strategy 0.57 0.50 1.00
(2) Performance-aspiration (above historical aspiration) 0.08 0.60 -0.01 * 1.00
(3) Performance-aspiration (below historical aspiration) -0.04 0.11 -0.03 * 0.01 * 1.00
(4) Performance-aspiration (above social aspiration) 0.12 0.16 0.09 * 0.00 0.08 * 1.00
(5) Performance-aspiration (below social aspiration) -0.04 0.21 -0.01 -0.09 * 0.82 * 0.12 * 1.00
(6) Environment Dynamism 0.03 0.02 -0.08 * 0.01 -0.05 * -0.13 * -0.06 * 1.00
(7) Advertisement Intensity 0.03 0.04 0.08 * -0.02 -0.01 0.10 * -0.02 -0.12 * 1.00
(8) R&D Intensity 0.11 0.27 0.07 * 0.06 * -0.13 * -0.02 * -0.26 * 0.00 0.07 * 1.00
(9) Firm Size 7.04 2.25 -0.06 * -0.08 * 0.08 * 0.18 * 0.19 * -0.12 * 0.07 * -0.13 * 1.00
(10) Financial Crisis 0.12 0.33 0.04 * -0.01 -0.01 0.06 * -0.01 * -0.06 * -0.06 * 0.03 * 0.03 * 1.00
(11) Industry Munificiency 0.06 0.08 0.03 * 0.00 0.03 * -0.02 * 0.01 -0.27 * 0.06 * 0.04 * -0.01 -0.01 1.00
(12) Industry Complexity 1398.87 1400.81 -0.11 * -0.01 0.05 * -0.20 * 0.04 * 0.05 * -0.01 -0.14 * 0.03 * 0.00 -0.14 * 1.00
(13) Unabsorbed Slack 0.44 0.27 -0.09 * 0.13 * 0.01 -0.03 * -0.08 * -0.06 * 0.18 * -0.15 * 0.36 * -0.02 * -0.08 * 0.19 * 1.00
(14) Absorbed Slack 0.40 0.60 0.04 * 0.13 * -0.15 * -0.02 * -0.36 * -0.01 0.15 * 0.78 * -0.24 * 0.01 * 0.02 * -0.13 * -0.09 * 1.00
(15) Potential Slack 1.00 5.47 0.00 -0.01 0.02 * 0.00 0.00 0.02 * 0.11 * -0.03 * 0.09 * 0.00 -0.05 * 0.03 * 0.15 * -0.05 * 1.00




chance of acquiring firms within their focal industry. However, firms performing below 
the social aspiration level did not support the hypothesis 1. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is 
partially supported for firms performing below their historical aspiration level. 
In hypothesis 2, I discussed about firms performing above their aspiration level. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that as firms’ performance increase, they will more likely to 
acquire target firms within their focal industries rather than target firms operating 
outside of their industry boundaries. Model 2 and model 3 each supports this hypothesis 
by showing positive and statistically significant coefficients. These results illustrate that 
one standard deviation increase in performance relative to historical and social 
aspiration levels leads to increases in the possibility of acquiring firms within their 
industries by 49.1% and 53.3% respectively when firms perform above their aspiration 
levels. Therefore, the results fully support hypothesis 2. 
Table 3 tests hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 by adding moderating effects of 
environment dynamism to the relationship between attainment discrepancy and 
acquisition strategies. Model 4 and model 5 now includes interaction terms of each 
attainment discrepancy level to environmental dynamisms. Hypothesis 3 predicted that 
when operating environment gets highly dynamic for firms performing below their 
aspiration level, they will view the dynamic environment as a growth opportunity and 
try to seize the opportunities embedded in their industry. Therefore, instead of trying to 
find competent solution from outside of their industries through acquiring target firms in 
different 
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Table 2. Main Effects. Logit regression of attainment discrepancy on acquisition strategies 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Controls Historical Social 










Environment Dynamism -0.0958 -0.1361 -0.0248 
 
(-0.76)    (-1.05) (-0.19) 
R&D Intensity  0.8434+   0.5262* 0.9212* 
 
(1.92) (2.16) (2.21) 
Advertisement Intensity  0.5073**  0.5755** 0.4643** 
 
(2.98) (3.27) (2.79) 
Firm Size -0.1353 -0.1613 -0.2271 
 
(-0.93)    (-1.09) (-1.50) 
Financial Crisis 0.2305+   0.2522* 0.2140+ 
 
(1.89) (2.06) (1.73) 
Industry Munificiency -0.0928 -0.0845 -0.0575 
 
(-0.72)    (-0.66) (-0.44) 
Industry Complexity -0.12 -0.1571 -0.0154 
 
(-0.98)    (-1.25) (-0.12) 
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Table 2 continued 
    
Unabsorbed Slack -0.2235 -0.3171* -0.193 
 
(-1.48)    (-2.02) (-1.25) 
Absorbed Slack  -0.6286 -0.8295** -0.7805+ 
 
(-1.43)    (-2.73) (-1.76) 
Potential Slack  0.0346 0.0538 0.0463 
 
(0.29) (0.45) (0.39) 
Altman’s Zscore 0.079 0.2042 0.0466 
 
(0.60) (1.39) (0.32) 
Number of observations 1209 1205 1209 
Pseudo R2 0.0164 0.0216 0.025 
Log-Likelihood -813.2 -806.1 -806 
Chi-Square 21.4 30.41 32 
Degree of Freedom 11 13 13 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
   
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 3. Interaction Effects. Logit regression of attainment discrepancy on acquisition strategies 
  (4) (5) 
  Historical Social 
Performance-aspiration (below aspiration) -0.3825+ -0.9267** 
 
(-1.70) (-2.79) 
Performance -aspiration * Dynamism (below aspiration)  0.1649 1.2600** 
 
(0.76) (2.60) 
Performance-aspiration (above aspiration) 2.1374*** 0.8457*** 
 
(3.50) (3.32) 
Performance -aspiration * Dynamism (above aspiration) -1.5807** -0.3715+ 
 
(-2.83) (-1.67) 
Environment Dynamism -0.0193 0.1714 
 
(-0.14) -1.09 
R&D Intensity  0.5670* 1.1736** 
 
(2.28) (2.59) 
Advertisement Intensity  0.5768** 0.4773** 
 
(3.26) (2.80) 
Firm Size -0.1864 -0.2541+ 
 
(-1.25) (-1.67) 




Table 3 Continued   
   
Industry Munificiency -0.1102 -0.0899 
 
(-0.84) (-0.69) 
Industry Complexity -0.163 0.0124 
 
(-1.28) -0.1 
Unabsorbed Slack -0.3109* -0.2058 
 
(-1.98) (-1.32) 
Absorbed Slack  -0.9226** -1.0684* 
 
(-2.88) (-2.34) 
Potential Slack  0.0546 0.0527 
 
(0.45) (0.44) 
Altman’s Zscore 0.1667 0.0679 
 
(1.14) (0.47) 
Number of observations 1205 1209 
Pseudo R2 0.0256 0.0306 
Log-Likelihood -802.8 -801.5 
Chi-Square 36.53 37.4 
Degree of Freedom 15 15 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses ; + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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industries, they will try to pursue growth by acquiring target firms within their industry 
as their environment gets more dynamic. This hypothesis is partially supported from 
model 5 as the interaction coefficient for negative attainment discrepancy to 
environment dynamism shows positive value while the coefficient for negative 
attainment discrepancy shows negative value. This indicates that the main effect of 
negative attainment discrepancy to acquisition strategies is negatively moderated. In 
other words, when environment get dynamic, firms performing below the social 
aspiration level tend to less acquire target firms in different industries as their 
performance increases, but no support was found for firms performing below their 
historical aspiration level.  
Last but not least, hypothesis 4 predicted that the main effect of positive attainment 
discrepancy to acquisition strategies will be mitigated as the environment gets dynamic. 
When firms’ performances increase highly above than their aspiration level, they tend to 
view dynamic environment as a challenge rather than an opportunity due to the fear of 
them being trapped in an organizational inertia and their existing resources and 
capabilities becoming obsolete. The adverse influence generated from a failure to adjust 
to highly rapid environmental changes will critically impact firms who desire to remain 
their already successful positions in their markets. Therefore, hypothesis 4 predicated 
that firms performing above their aspiration level will less likely to acquire target firms 
from their industries when the environment gets dynamic in order to explore new areas. 
This hypothesis is fully supported by model 4 and model 5. In both models, the 
coefficients for positive attainment discrepancy show positive value while the 
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coefficients for interaction terms show negative values. This change in coefficient sign 
illustrates that as the environment gets highly dynamic, increase in performance relative 
to aspiration level leads firms to less acquire target firms within their industry but to 
acquire target firms from different industries. Therefore, the result supports hypothesis 4 
for both historical and social aspiration models. 
 In addition to tables, Figure 1 depicts the interaction effects of environment 
dynamism for firms performing below their social aspiration level while Figure 2a and 
Figure 2b depict the interaction effects for firms performing above the historical and 
social aspiration levels. Figure 1 shows how firms’ acquisition behavior changes 
regarding their performance status relative to social aspiration as well as to the degree of 
environmental dynamism. When firms are performing below their social aspiration level 
and when their environment is relatively less dynamic, the probability of undertaking 
related acquisition falls as performance increases. However, once the environment 
becomes highly dynamic, the negative effect obtained during the low dynamic 
environment gets mitigated, shifting the negative direction of the curve to a positive 
direction. This shows that in highly dynamic environments, increase in performance 
level for firms performing below their social aspiration level increases the probability of 
them undertaking related acquisition.  
 On the other hand, Figure 2a and Figure 2b shows the influence of 
environmental dynamism on positive attainment discrepancies to acquisition behavior 
for each historical and social aspiration level. Both Figures depict that in low dynamic 
environments, firms’ performance increases above their historical and social aspiration 
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level leads to increases in the probability of acquiring target firms within their focal 
industry, yet this relationship gets weaken when environments become highly dynamic. 
Moreover, the environmental effect appears to be stronger in historical aspiration model 
than social aspiration level. In Figure 2a, the direction of curve gets completely opposite 
when environments become highly dynamic from environment being less dynamic, 
while the shift of curve in Figure 2b is less dramatic than Figure 2a. This illustrates that 
when firms’ performances increase above their historical aspiration level in highly 
dynamic environment, they now tend to acquire target firms from different industries 
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This paper demonstrates how internal and external conditions of firms 
simultaneously influence their target selection in acquisition context through applying 
the BTOF perspective and task environment dimension. I propose that when firms have 
decided to undergo acquisitions, their selection of target firms from diverse industries 
are influenced by their relative performance level to aspiration level and this relationship 
is contingent upon the degree of environmental dynamism. The results have indicated 
that when firms perform below their historical aspiration level, they were more likely to 
acquire target firms from different industries than from their focal industries as their 
performance level increases. On the other hand, when firms are performing above the 
historical and social aspiration levels, they were more inclined to acquire target firms 
within their focal industry than from different industries as their performance increases 
above the aspiration levels. However, when operating environment becomes highly 
dynamic, these relationships tend to get mitigated. For instance, when firms perform 
below their social aspiration level and when environment becomes highly volatile, they 
tend to less acquire target firms from outside of their focal industries. Similarly, when 
firms perform above their historical and social aspiration levels and when environment 
becomes highly dynamic, they tend to less acquire target firms from within their focal 
industries. These results offer an important insight into why firms competing in same 
industries undergo different types of acquisition by uncovering different motivations that 
drive those acquisition behaviors.  
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The paper makes both theoretical contribution and managerial implications. 
Theoretically, the paper improves the understanding of the application of behavioral 
theory on organizational behaviors by integrating the theory with the task environment 
dimensions. Through analyzing both internal and external effects on organizational 
strategies, the study provides a more synthetic framework for understanding the 
relationship between performance feedback theory and organizational behaviors, thereby 
contributing to the relatively nascent stream of research that extends the behavioral 
theory into the domain of corporate level strategies. Secondly, and more importantly, by 
showing how environmental dynamism motivate firms to undertake different acquisition 
behaviors, this paper implies that environmental characteristics may not uniformly affect 
all firms competing in an industry. Rather, the influence of environment may 
respectively depend on firm’s specific internal situation. Last but not least, I also 
contribute to the M&A literatures by identifying comprehensive antecedents of direction 
of acquisition in regard to both internal and external situations. By demonstrating how 
individual’s specific condition as well as environmental feature motivates firms to select 
different target firms across the variety of industries, the study improves the 
understanding of why and when firms engage in such different acquisition behaviors. 
This theoretical contribution also indicates significant managerial implication by 
emphasizing the needs for managers to not only tailor their strategies according to their 
internal and external contingencies but also to identify underlying motivation of its 
competitor’s strategic actions in order to effectively cope with their strategic changes. 
Furthermore, I posit that even same external environment situation may pose different 
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effects to managerial perspectives depending on firm’s independent performance status.  
   
7. Limitation and Future Research 
 
The study contains several limitations that may encourage avenues for future 
research. First, the measurement of defining each acquisition into related acquisition 
versus unrelated acquisition has been relatively simple. Although this study defined and 
divided the acquisition strategies into binary variable through comparing the first two 
digits of SIC code, other studies have argued that defining related and unrelated 
acquisition through SIC code may bias the measurement (i.e., Park 2002). Developing a 
new methodology of measuring how much acquirers’ and targets’ industries differ and 
making it as a continuous variable may improve the accuracy of measuring the degree of 
relatedness between two firms in the acquisition process.  
Secondly, the sample contained firms who have undergone multiple 
acquisitions in a single year with mixed directions. For instance, few firms have 
acquired several target firms from both related and unrelated industries in a same single 
year. Although it is simpler to just exclude those firms from the total sample, the results 
obtained from that sample may bias the whole result. Therefore, instead of deleting 
those firms from the total sample, I have simply considered each acquisition per year as 
a different firm unit even if the multiple acquisitions were undertaken by a single firm. 
One way to solve this issue would be to divide the time frame into shorter periods (i.e., 
quarterly) than annually. However, few of the firms still have engaged in multiple 
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acquisitions within each quarter. Moreover, the issue arises from a possibility that 
managers may not evaluate their current positions and make strategic decisions 
stemming from performance feedbacks that often. Therefore, this limitation also calls 
for a need to develop a new measurement for relatedness or unrelatedness between 
acquirer firms and target firms for firms that have engaged in multiple acquisitions in a 
single year.  
A third opportunity for future study arises from the results of this study. 
According to the study results, few of the hypotheses were not supported under specific 
aspiration levels. For instance, hypothesis 1 was only supported from the historical 
aspiration model while hypothesis 3 was only supported from social aspiration model. A 
lot of existing studies regarding the application of the performance feedback theories 
have interchangeable applied two different aspiration levels in same model or combined 
two measures by giving weights. However, the results from this study imply that firms 
may differently react to individual aspiration levels depending on their emphasis to each 
aspiration level. Delving into how firms differently react to each of the aspiration level 
or when firms shift their focus of attention from one to another reference point may 
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본 논문은 인수 기업의 사  성과가 환경 조건에 따라 다른 산업에 속해있
는 피인수 기업의 선택에 어떠한 향을 미치는지 연구하고 있다. 기존의 많
은 연구들이 기업들의 인수 결정에 향을 미치는 요소에 하여 살펴보았지
만 인수를 진행하기로 한 후에 어떠한 피인수 기업들을 선정할 것인가에 
한 연구는 미흡한 것으로 보인다. 본 연구는 미국의 제조 기업들을 심으로, 
기업들의 특정한 인수 략( 련 는 비 련 인수)은 각 기업의 
performance feedback 상황과 인수 기업이 경쟁하고 있는 특정 산업의 환경
인 요소들에 의하여 정해진다고 주장하고 있다. 행동학  과 task 
environment dimension (i.e., dynamism)을 도입하여 환경 인 특성이 기업의 
인수 략에 미치는 contingency effects를 살펴 보고 있다. 따라서 본 논문
은 인수합병의 사  요소를 더 통합 으로 악하여 performance feedback 
theory와 인수합병 문헌 모두에 의미 있는 시사 을 제공한다는 공헌 이 있
다.   
 
주요어 : performance feedback, 피인수 기업 선택, 인수 략, 환경  
dynamism 
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